

EDITOR'S NOTE

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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

AUG 13 1986

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

NO. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1986

NETTIE JORDAN, Petitioner

v.

JOHN SCHROEDER, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of HERMAN SCHROEDER,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE WASHINGTON STATE COURT OF APPEALS

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August 13, 1986

48 pg's



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.1
LIST OF PARTIES.i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESiii, iv
OPINIONS BELOW2
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS3
STATUTES INVOLVED.4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.5
ARGUMENT16
CONCLUSION20
APPENDIX22

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Petitioner, Nettie Jordan, was denied her right to a fair civil jury trial under United States Constitution Amendment VII and denied her right to due process under United States Constitution Amendment V and Amendment XIV because her retained counsel failed to adequately prepare witnesses, failed to pursue opposing counsel's waiver of the Deadman's Statute under Washington State law, and offered exhibits containing inadmissible hearsay, all of which severely prejudiced her case?

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties to the proceeding below were the Petitioner, Nettie Jordan, and the Respondent, John Schroeder, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Herman Schroeder.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	<u>Page</u>
<u>Washington State Cases</u>	
<u>King v. Clodfelter</u> , 10 Wn.App. 514, 518 P.2d 206 (1974)	18
<u>Young v. Liddington</u> , 50 WN.2d 78, 309 P.2d 761 (1957)	15
<u>Federal Cases</u>	
<u>Cook v. United States</u> , 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925)	17
<u>Evitts v. Lucey</u> , 469 U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836 Note 7, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985)	19
<u>Jacob v. New York</u> , 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1942)	17
<u>Potashnick v. Port City Construction Company</u> , 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980)	17, 20
<u>Powell v. Alabama</u> , 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) . .	17
<u>Statutes</u>	
<u>28 U.S.C. §1257(3)</u>	4

Rules and Regulations

Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure 18.14(e).	3
Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure 17.1.	20

Constitutional Provisions

**United States Constitution
Amendments V, VII, XIV. . . . 16, 17, 20**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES

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NETTIE JORDAN, Petitioner

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JOHN SCHROEDER, as Personal
Representative of the
Estate of HERMAN SCHROEDER,
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
WASHINGTON STATE COURT OF APPEALS

The Petitioner, Nettie Jordan,
respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari
issue to review the judgment of dismissal of
Petitioner's appeal in the Washington State
Court of Appeals entered May 15, 1986 after

denial by the Washington State Supreme Court of Mrs. Jordan's petition for review of an interlocutory order of dismissal.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington Commissioner's ruling granting the motion on the merits pursuant to Washington State Rules of Appellate Procedure was not reported and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto at p. 1a, infra.

The order of Division I of the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington denying Petitioner's motion to modify the Commissioner's ruling is reprinted in the Appendix hereto at p. 9a, infra, and the notation order of the Washington State Supreme Court denying the petition for review of that order is reprinted in the Appendix hereto at p. 10a, infra.

The Supreme Court of Washington's judgment of dismissal entered after that

court's denial of Mrs. Jordan's petition for review is contained in the mandate issued May 15, 1986 and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto at p. 11a, infra.

JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

On August 31, 1984, judgment upon a jury verdict on behalf of the Respondent was entered in King County Superior Court of the State of Washington, from which the Petitioner, Nettie Jordan, appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the appeal was clearly without merit under the Washington State Rules of Appellate Procedure 18.14(e). On January 31, 1986, the state Court of Appeals Commissioner Larry A. Jordan granted Respondent's motion to dismiss. On February 27, 1986, the state Court of Appeals denied Mrs. Jordan's motion to review and modify Commissioner Jordan's order. On

May 6, 1986, the Washington State Supreme Court also denied Mrs. Jordan's petition for review of the denial. The Washington Supreme Court entered its judgment of dismissal of the appeal by its mandate dated May 15, 1986. Jurisdiction of this court to review the state Court of Appeals' decision is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3). Since, under Washington State Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Washington State Supreme Court's judgment of dismissal was not entered until issuance of the mandate on May 15, 1986, this petition for a writ of certiorari is timely within the meaning of Rules 20.2, 20.4 and 28 U.S.C. §2101(c).

STATUTES INVOLVED

28 U.S.C. §1257(3) Jurisdiction over State Courts.

The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts: ". . . by Writ of Certiorari . . .

where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of or commission held or authority exercised under the United States."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner, Nettie Jordan, began seeing Herman Schroeder, M.D., in 1967 because she was concerned about the length and severity of her menstrual period. Initially Dr. Schroeder prescribed Theelin, an injectible hormone of estrogen, for her excessive bleeding from May, 1967 through November 29, 1971. On February 21, 1974, Dr. Schroeder performed a complete abdominal hysterectomy and a bilateral salpingo-oopherectomy removing her uterus, fallopian tubes and ovaries in the surgery. Mrs. Jordan did not consent to the removal of her ovaries. Dr. Schroeder did not inform Mrs. Jordan that her ovaries had been removed

and she first discovered that her ovaries had been removed when she received the anesthesiologist bill after the surgery.

In January, 1977, Mrs. Jordan commenced a civil action against Dr. Schroeder's estate for medical negligence and lack of informed consent in King County Superior Court in Washington state. Dr. Schroeder died in 1975; John Schroeder was appointed personal representative for the estate. The estate obtained summary judgments on the medical negligence claim and on the informed consent cause of action in 1981, the trial court adopting the estate's argument that any evidence admissible on the informed consent claim was barred by the so-called "Deadman statute," RCW 5.60.030, and that Dr. Schroeder had not been medically negligent in prescribing the Theelin hormone. Mrs. Jordan appealed from the 1981 summary judgment on the informed consent, and Division I of the

Court of Appeals of the State of Washington,
No. 10180-3-I, reversed and remanded
for a trial on the merits set for June 13,
1983. Clerk's Papers (hereafter CP) 54.

In her appeal from the 1981 summary judgment Mrs. Jordan argued that evidence of her conversations and transactions with the late Dr. Schroeder should be permitted at the summary judgment motion because "the opposing party may waive the Deadman statute during trial by, for example, not objecting." CP (Opinion of Court of Appeals at 5). Judge Swanson, writing for a unanimous panel of the state court which included Judges Durham and Scholfield, rejected that argument as to the summary judgment motion, but concluded that there were facts admissible in evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that Mrs. Jordan had not been informed of the potential removal of her ovaries prior to the surgery in 1974. Id. The Court of Appeals

also determined that the trial court should have granted Mrs. Jordan's motion for reconsideration on the issue of medical negligence on the basis of Dr. Kenneth Niswander's affidavit, which was submitted after the summary judgment on that issue was initially granted. Id.

Upon remand to King County Superior Court, Mrs. Jordan retained a new attorney for the trial. One of her two prior attorneys had died, and she was no longer represented by her counsel on appeal. On August 9, 1984 the trial by jury on the merits began. Mrs. Jordan's new trial attorney, concerned with insuring an "error-free" record and jury speculation over the lack of any testimony regarding Dr. Schroeder's discussions with Mrs. Jordan about the hysterectomy, proposed an "admonition" for the court to give the jury explaining that the Deadman statute barred

such testimony. August 9 TR 3-16. Counsel for the estate objected to the form of the admonition proposed by Mrs. Jordan's trial counsel arguing that it was a comment on the evidence prohibited by Article 4, Section 16 of the Washington State Constitution. The ~~al~~ court rejected the estate's objection and read Mrs. Jordan's counsel's admonition to the jury. Ibid; August 9, TR 37-40; 41-42; CP 24.

Based on the court's reading of his admonition, Mrs. Jordan's attorney assumed that neither party would offer evidence of any statements by or transactions with the late Dr. Schroeder as prohibited by the Deadman's statute. Thus, in opening statement, Mrs. Jordan's counsel did not refer to any statements by or transactions with Dr. Schroeder. August 8, TR 43-61.

However, the estate's counsel promptly waived the protection of the Deadman's

statute in opening statement. The estate referred to one of Mrs. Jordan's office visits to Dr. Schroeder in 1974, stating that:

. . .she was admitted to Seattle General Hospital with her first episode of a massive uterine hemorrhage. At that time, she refused still to have the hysterectomy, and throughout the course of treatment by Dr. Schroeder, he kept saying, "you've got the fibroids, you've got the abnormal bleeding" and recommended hysterectomy which she refused.

August 9, TR 68.

A few moments later, in referring to the actual operation itself, the estate's attorney said that "three weeks later, she hemorrhaged again. Back in the hospital. This time she agreed. The hysterectomy was performed February 21, 1974." Id. Mrs. Jordan's trial counsel made no motions that the estate had waived the Deadman statute in opening statement.

The estate also waived the Deadman statute during the course of the trial by questioning several of its own experts as to statements by or transactions with Dr. Schroeder. The estate called Dr. Raymond J. Clark of the University of Washington and Swedish Hospital as an expert in obstetrics and gynecology. Using Dr. Schroeder's medical records, previously offered into evidence by plaintiff, counsel for the estate asked Dr. Clark, "did it appear from Dr. Schroeder's records both a D and C and hysterectomy were advised on that first visit?" (to Dr. Schroeder in 1967) Answer, "Yes, yes, he did recommend both procedures." II TR 269. Immediately thereafter, counsel for the estate focused on the abdominal hysterectomy surgery in 1974, and asked Dr. Clark, "does it appear from your review of the operative report by Dr. Schroeder he considered leaving the tubes and ovaries?"

Answer, "Well, I would have to interpret his statement, as I recall, that he evaluated the status of the ovary during the surgery as meaning that he had made a decision during the operative procedure that he felt removal of the ovaries was necessary to cure this patient and to avoid a subsequent operation which would have been much more serious." II TR 305.

After Dr. Clark, the estate called Mitzi Kunitsugu, Dr. Schroeder's office nurse as the next defense witness. She testified that Dr. Schroeder would always tell his patients about hysterectomies, and when asked on direct examination about what Dr. Schroeder told Mrs. Jordan, Ms. Kunitsugu said "well, he told every patient that had a hysterectomy." II TR 349. Although plaintiff's counsel objected that it was a non-responsive question, he did nothing to

pursue the Deadman's issue with regard to that witness.

The last expert witness called by the estate was Dr. Charles D. Stipp, a gynecologist at the University of Washington. The estate again waived the Deadman's statute by inquiring of him on direct examination as follows: "Question: One further matter. From your review of the records, is there any documentation of actual conversations between Dr. Schroeder and Mrs. Jordan prior to surgery with respect to the risks and the benefits and alternatives to surgery? (Emphasis added.) Answer: I don't recall anything in the records concerning any discussion of that nature." II TR 368. On redirect, estate's counsel followed-up by asking "can you tell from the records what was or what was not discussed with Mrs. Jordan prior to surgery? (Emphasis added.) Answer: No." II TR 373. At no time during

the trial did Mrs. Jordan's trial counsel pursue motions regarding the estate's waiver of the Deadman statute. Consequently, although the Court of Appeals had earlier acknowledged that the Deadman statute may be waived, trial counsel for Mrs. Jordan never pursued the issue of waiver and prejudiced his client's claim because of the lack of admissible evidence on the issue of informed consent.

The trial court record also reveals severe deficiencies with regard to trial counsel's presentation of Mrs. Jordan's case. In opening statement, Mrs. Jordan's counsel referred to his client as being "hypertense" and suggested he was not intelligent enough to understand the medical evidence in this case. August 8, TR 46, 49. Although he called five medical doctors as witnesses on behalf of Plaintiff, he never provided any of them with a complete set of all of Mrs.

Jordan's medical records prior to trial so that they could prepare adequately for cross-examination, see, e.g., August 8, TR 13-15, 18-20, 22-23, 37-38, 59, 133. Moreover, Mrs. Jordan's trial counsel offered into evidence all of Mrs. Jordan's records, without seeking to expunge all of the opinions of Mrs. Jordan's prior treating physicians. August 13, TR 2-3; CP and Supplemental CP. Furthermore, counsel's failure to object occurred even though the trial court acknowledged that portions of Mrs. Jordan's medical records would be inadmissible pursuant to Young v. Liddington, 50 Wn.2d 78, 309 P.2d 761 (1957). Mrs. Jordan's trial counsel also failed to object to the estate's motions to portions of Mrs. Jordan's medical records. August 8, TR 16-24. Defense counsel was able to use those same records to impeach plaintiff's experts by the inadmissible hearsay opinion of her prior

treating physicians, none of whom were called to testify.

Finally, plaintiff's counsel took no exceptions to any of the jury instructions and did not ask that closing argument be recorded.

The jury deliberated for approximately four hours and returned a defense verdict on August 17, 1984. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict on August 31, 1984 and it is from that judgment that the Petitioner, Nettie Jordan, seeks to have reversed for a new trial.

ARGUMENT

The Petitioner had the right to retain competent civil counsel under the V, VII and XIV Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Washington State Court of Appeals decision finding that no such right exists conflicts with a decision by a Federal Court of Appeals.

A civil litigant is entitled to a constitutionally fair jury trial and due process of law under the United States Constitution. Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1942); U.S. Const. Amends. VII and XIV. Implicit in due process is the right to retain competent counsel during a jury trial. See e.g. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Cook v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); Potashnick v. Port City Construction Company, 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980). A litigant's right to counsel in a complex civil trial is implicit in due process because it is virtually impossible for a litigant to secure a meaningful opportunity to be heard without the meaningful assistance of competent counsel. See generally, Potashnick v. Port City Construction, supra.

In examining Petitioner's case, it is obvious that Mrs. Jordan was not afforded that opportunity at the case at bench. Testimony about the information Dr. Schroeder did or did not provide Mrs. Jordan regarding her abdominal hysterectomy was critical to establishing Mrs. Jordan's lack of informed consent. That Mrs. Jordan's testimony on this point was critical is shown by the state Court of Appeals's reversal of the 1981 summary judgment on the basis of Mrs. Jordan's affidavits. Supplemental CP. Washington State recognizes that the protection can be waived. King v. Clodfelter, 10 Wn.App. 514, 518 P.2d 206 (1974). At trial Mrs. Jordan's attorney should have pursued a legal ruling that the estate had waived the Deadman's statute. Further, counsel's failure to provide copies of all medical records to his expert witnesses in preparation for trial and the

offering into evidence of those records without deleting their hearsay portions opened up Mrs. Jordan and her expert witnesses to extensive cross-examination on inadmissible evidence. To correct these errors the remedy must be a new trial to allow Mrs. Jordan the opportunity to be heard.

Commissioner Jordan, speaking for the Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court, did not reach the issue of the propriety of counsel's actions because the Commissioner interpreted Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836 Note 7, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), rev. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1783 to mean that "the right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent upon the constitutional right to counsel". However, Petitioner maintains that the right to counsel is not the issue before the court; rather, it is her due process and right to a

fair jury trial under Amendments V, VII and XIV of the United States Constitution. Therefore, the Washington State Court of Appeals and its decision conflicts with a decision of the 5th Circuit in Potashnick, supra, in this case regarding a critical due process right.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons suggested above, the Petition for Certiorari should be granted. The case presents a conflict between the state court decision and a federal court of appeals decision providing grounds under Rule 17.1(b). The constitutional issue involving the due process clauses presents another basis for granting the petitioner under Rule 17.1(c).

DATED this 24th day of November, 1986.

Respectfully Submitted,

APPELWICK, TRICKEY, SLUITER &
SPICER

M.J.Tri
Michael J. Trickey
Counsel of Record

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI - 21
8259

APPENDIX

	<u>Page</u>
COMMISSIONER'S RULING GRANTING MOTION ON THE MERITS.1a
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO MODIFY16a
MAY 6, 1986 LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON18a
MANDATE.20a

No. 15422-2-I/1 RULING

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION I

NETTIE JORDAN,)	
)	
Appellant,)	NO. 15422-2-I
)	
v.)	COMMISSIONER'S
)	RULING GRANTING
JOHN SCHROEDER, as)	MOTION ON THE
Personal Representative)	MERITS
for Estate of Herman)	
Schroeder,)	
)	
Respondent.)	
)	

Nettie Jordan appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the treating physician in a medical malpractice lawsuit. Respondent John Schroeder, as personal representative for Dr. Herman Schroeder, has filed a motion on the merits to affirm. The commissioner has heard oral argument and has determined that the motion should be granted.

No. 15422-2-I/2 RULING

FACTS

In 1967, Mrs. Jordan visited Dr. Herman Schroeder because she was concerned about the length of her menstrual periods. He diagnosed uterine fibroids and prescribed Theelin, and injected estrogen. This estrogen therapy continued until November of 1971. Throughout this period, and until February, 1974, Schroeder recommended that Mrs. Jordan have a hysterectomy, which she refused. In early February, 1974, Jordan entered Seattle General Hospital's emergency room with acute uterine hemorrhaging. She was treated with drugs, again refused surgery and was discharged two days later. Two weeks later, Jordan again was admitted to Seattle General Hospital with the same problem. At that time she agreed to the surgery and signed a "Medical/Surgical Request and Consent" form which authorized Schroeder to

No. 15422-2-I/3 RULING

perform surgical treatment and any other procedures he judged necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of her condition. Schroeder performed a hysterectomy and also removed Jordan's ovaries and fallopian tubes.

Schroeder died in October, 1975.

Jordan filed this lawsuit in January, 1977, alleging negligence and lack of informed consent. Schroeder's estate moved for summary judgment on both causes of action; summary judgment was granted in 1981. Jordan appealed and this court reversed and remanded for trial on the merits in Cause No. 10180-3-I. This court's decision rejected Jordan's argument that the deadman statute did not apply to prevent her from testifying to conversations and transactions with Schroeder, but did hold that there were questions of fact whether there had been

No. 15422-2-I/4 RULING

negligence and whether Jordan had given informed consent to the surgical procedures.

Trial after remand was held in August, 1984. Jordan had hired a new attorney. At that attorney's request, the trial court admonished the jury that Jordan and her husband would not be able to testify about conversations and transactions with Schroeder because of the deadman statute. In opening argument and at trial, Schroeder's attorney, without objection, referred to statements made by Schroeder about the necessity for surgery. The jury returned a defense verdict on August 17, 1984. Jordan appeals and presents three issues.

ISSUES

1. May Jordan raise the issue of whether Schroeder's counsel waived the deadman statute, RCW 5.60.030, for the first time on appeal?

No. 15422-2-I/5 RULING

2. Did the trial court err in "commenting on the evidence" by referring to Jordan's claims based on informed consent and medical negligence?

3. Was Jordan denied her right to a fair trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel who allegedly failed to adequately prepare witnesses, failed to point out the alleged waiver of the deadman statute, and offered exhibits containing allegedly inadmissible hearsay?

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO
GRANT A MOTION ON THE MERITS

RAP 18.14(e) provides:

A motion on the merits will be granted in whole or in part if the appeal or any part thereof is determined to be clearly without merit. In making these determinations, the commissioner will consider all relevant factors including whether the issues on review (1) are clearly controlled by settled law, (2) are factual and supported by the evidence, or (3) are matters of judicial discretion and the

No. 15422-2-I/6 · RULING

decision was clearly within the discretion of the trial court.

In applying these criteria, the commissioner determines that the appeal is clearly without merit.

DECISION

ISSUE ONE

Jordan first contends that Schroeder's estate waived the deadman statute by referring to transactions between Schroeder and Jordan. For example, in her brief Jordan cites to Schroeder's opening statement, in which his attorney referred to his recommendation of a hysterectomy, and to testimony relating to Schroeder's medical records. There is no indication in the record that Jordan's attorney objected to the statements or to the admission of any of this testimony.

RAP 2.5(a) provides:

(a) Errors Raised for First Time on Review. The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court. However, a party may raise the following claimed errors for the first time in the appellate court: (1) lack of trial court jurisdiction, (2) failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted, and (3) manifest error affecting a constitutional right. A party or the court may raise at any time the question of appellate court jurisdiction.

Although Jordan argues that an exception can be made when the error results in a denial of procedural due process, she has not shown how the admission of testimony, even if in violation of the deadman statute, did so. The present case is distinguishable from Esmieu v. Scrag, 88 Wn.2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1977), cited by Jordan. In that case the court held there was a violation of procedural due process where a hearing was held and testimony taken without notice to the defendants or their counsel. There is no

No. 15422-2-I/8 RULING

allegation here that Jordan was denied a hearing without proper notice. Since the claim of waiver does not fall within any of the exceptions set forth in RAP 2.5(a), it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

ISSUE TWO

Jordan next argues the trial court impermissibly commented on the evidence at the close of all testimony in violation of Const. Art. 4, §16. Prior to excusing the jury for the day, the trial court stated:

Those instructions will be the law that the Court will at that time have decided on and be available for you. The Court will read those instructions to you on Friday morning, and you will be able to follow right along with it on those instructions. The plaintiff will have his argument and the issues being twofold:

One issue was, Was there any negligence in the sense of the standard of practice on the instructions given to you? And the second issue will be one related to informed consent. Did or did not

No. 15422-2-I/9 RULING

Nettie Jordan get informed from Dr. Schroeder, with all the evidence in the case and this matter being a certain risk as to the circumstances as it finally turned out in connection with this operation?

. . . I wanted to tell you about this today so you'd know what to look for. . . [Y]ou should. . . be ready and refreshed and able to consider all of the evidence in light of the Court's law.

I told you at the beginning of the case, and I reiterate now, the evidence that you are to consider consists of the testimony of the witnesses and likewise the exhibits admitted into evidence, all of which will be available to you.

A trial court's statements are an impermissible comment on the evidence if the jury can infer from what the court said or did not say that it personally believed or disbelieved the testimony in question.

Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wn.2d 127, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980). No inference either for or against Jordan can be

drawn from the above-mentioned statement and thus there was no comment on the evidence.

It should also be noted that at the beginning of the trial the court told the jury:

I may have told some of you earlier about the constitutional prohibition against the Court commenting on the evidence, and I've told you I mean it sincerely. I'll try not to comment in any way. If it would seem to you I would comment during the trial or the giving of the instructions, disregard the comments entirely.

In addition, the trial court instructed the jury by giving WPI 1.01, which stated in part:

The law does not permit me to comment on the evidence in any way and I have not intentionally done so. If it appears to you that I have so commented, during either the trial or the giving of these instructions, you must disregard the comment.

Thus, if there was error, it was corrected.

Balandzich v. Demeroto, 10 Wn.App. 718, 725, 519 P.2d 994 (1974).

ISSUE THREE

Jordan's primary contention is that she was denied effective assistance of counsel because her trial attorney did not make proper objections (e.g., to the introduction of evidence of transactions and conversations with Schroeder), failed to provide her witnesses with a complete set of medical records, introduced her entire medical record without seeking to delete opinions and failed to except to the jury instructions.

Jordan cites no authority of effective assistance of counsel extends to civil cases. In Seventh Elect Church v. Rogers, 34 Wn.App. 105, 120, 660 P.2d 280 (1983), the court stated that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a civil case based on "the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United

No. 15422-2-I/12 RULING

States Constitution is frivolous." Jordan appears to base her claim on procedural due process rights. This claim, however, is clearly without merit.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the constitutional right to counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836 n.7 (1985). Unless a litigant is constitutionally entitled to an attorney, there is no recognized right to effective assistance of counsel. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88, 71 L.Ed.2d 475, 102 S.Ct. 1300 (1982); accord, Seventh Elect Church v. Rogers, supra; see also In Re Moseley, 34 Wn.App. 179, 184, 660 P.2d 315 (1983).

Legal counsel is "not available as a matter of constitutional right to the

No. 15422-2-I/13 RULING

unimprisoned in civil cases." Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1437 (11th Cir. 1985). A civil litigant has no constitutional right to counsel unless the individual is being deprived of some significant liberty interest. In Re Lewis, 88 Wn.2d 556, 558, 564 P.2d 328 (1974); In Re Lacier, 84 Wn.2d 135, 138-39, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); In Re Adoption of Hernandez, 25 Wn.App. 447, 452, 607 P.2d 879 (1980). "Absent special statutory guarantees, the appointment of counsel is constitutionally required only when procedural fairness demands it." Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wn.2d 252, 253, 544 P.2d 17 (1975).

Here, Jordan voluntarily commenced this medical malpractice action against Schroeder's estate to recover damages for the alleged lack of informed consent and alleged medical negligence committed by Schroeder

No. 15422-2-I/14 RULING

during surgery. This case does not involve a contest between the unequal powers of the state and a private individual. Under these circumstances, the dispute did not involve matters of such a fundamental nature as to require appointment of counsel. In Re Adoption of Hernandez, supra; In Re Moseley, supra. Since Jordan had no legally recognized right to counsel, she could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Wainwright v. Tornay, supra. Now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion on the merits is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. It is further

ORDERED that Schroeder's request for attorney fees pursuant to Streater v. White, 26 Wn.App. 430, 613 P.2d 187 (1980), is denied.

Done this 13th day of January, 1986.

No. 15422-2-I/15 RULING

LARRY A. JORDAN
Court Commissioner

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON

NETTIE JORDAN,)	
)	
Appellant,)	NO. 15422-2-I
)	
v.)	Division One
)	
JOHN SCHROEDER, as)	ORDER DENYING
Personal Representative)	MOTION TO MODIFY
for Estate of Herman)	
Schroeder,)	
)	
Respondent.)	
)	

Nettie Jordan has filed a motion to modify a commissioner's ruling granting a motion on the merits and affirming the decision of the trial court. A panel of the court has considered the matter pursuant to In Re Marriage of Wolfe, 99 Wn.2d 531, 663 P.2d 469 (1983) and RAP 17.7 and has determined that the motion should be denied for the reasons set forth in the

commissioner's ruling. Now, therefore, it is
hereby

ORDERED that the motion to modify is
denied.

Done this 27th day of February, 1986.

SCHOLFIELD, C.J.

GROSSE, J.

COLEMAN, J.

THE SUPREME COURT
State of Washington
Olympia
98504-0611

Reginald H. Schriver 753-6080
Clerk Area 206

May 6, 1986

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Re: Supreme Court No. 52635-4 - Nettie
Jordan v. John Schroeder
Court of Appeals No. 15422-2-I

Counsel:

The above entitled petition for review
was considered by the Court on its May 6,
1986, petition for review calendar.

The petition was denied by order number
147/208 filed on May 6, 1986.

Very truly yours,

REGINALD N. SHRIVER
Supreme Court Clerk

crf

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON

NETTIE JORDAN,)	
)	
Appellant,)	MANDATE
)	
v.)	NO. 15422-2-I
)	
JOHN SCHROEDER, as)	King County No.
Personal Representative)	820679
for Estate of Herman)	
Schroeder,)	
)	
Respondent.)	
)	

The State of Washington to: The Superior
Court of the State of Washington in and for
King County

This is to certify that the Court of
Appeals of the State of Washington, Division
I, considered and granted a motion on the
merits in the above entitled case on
January 13, 1986. Accordingly, this cause is
mandated to the Superior Court from which
this appeal was taken for further proceedings

in accordance with the determination of that court.

Mandate after motion for dismissal granted. Petition for Review denied May 6, 1986 pursuant to RAP 14.4 costs are taxed as follows: One Hundred Eighty-Five and 20/100 (\$185.20) Dollars against Appellant in favor of Respondent.

cc: Nancy Bradburn-Johnson
Nettie Jordan
Mary H. Spillane

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunder set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Seattle, this 15th day of May, 1986.

RICHARD D. TAYLOR, Clerk
of the Court of Appeals,
State of Washington,
Division I